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Transcendental Academia: Deleuze and 





This article offers an introduction to the applied theory of Gilles Deleuze 
(c. 1925-1995) and Felix Guattari (c. 1930-1992) in the anthropology of 
religion. In work that explicitly cites Deleuze and/or the Deleuze and 
Guattari corpus, anthropological methodologies fall into two explicit 
categories. The first is what I have called a selective use methodology, in 
which Deleuzo-Guattarian terminology is employed without, or in 
contradiction to the metaphysical system that it emerged from. The second 
approach is the inverse, in which not only the concepts are taken into the 
study of religion, but the ontological baggage that the concepts come with. 
Unlike the selective use approach, this second type of usage maintains 
consistency between the object of analysis, the conceptual framework, and 
methodology. 
 Where the earlier Deleuze and Guattari work attempts to excavate 
concepts that could delineate the forces of movement within the 
“Mechanosphere”,1 the later co-authored work develops a tripartite division 
based on the composition of noumenal and actual objects (ideas, material, 
events). It is in the creation of a metaphysics with a tripartite division 
between the virtual, the actual, and the plane of immanence, contained 
within an absolute continuum between them, that forms the bedrock of 
Deleuzo-Guattarian thought. The virtual as a realm of possibility forms a 
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1 What is intended by the turn of phrase “There is no biosphere or noosphere, but 
everywhere the same Mechanosphere” is that the compartmentalisation of domains can be 
bridged by an appropriate conceptualisation of the forces that flow throughout the spheres, 
re-orienting the study of spheres based not on their distinction from each other, but the 
substances that flow through them. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 
60. 
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plane of immanence in feedback with the actual, which “falls from the 
plane like a fruit”, and the virtual relates the fruit “back to the plane as if to 
that which turns the object back into a subject.”2 This process through 
which subject-object relations are removed from nominalistic suppositions 
(subjects can be conceived of as virtual objects and objects as virtual 
subjects) has great appeal for anthropologists of religion grappling with the 
ontological schemas of research subjects foreign to the anthropologist. In 
selective-use applications, however, we see tendencies towards nominalism 
render rigorous fieldwork inconclusive. 
 This article will proceed by elucidating the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
conception of what religion is, as presented in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) 
and What Is Philosophy? (1991). The differentiation between aesthetic 
figures and conceptual personae from the latter is key to the empiricism 
that Deleuze and Guattari want to bring to the domain of thought. Religion 
is described within these two works as a transcendental form of thought 
that forcibly evades an immanent-empirical approach to the world. The 
Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of ‘counter-effectuation’ elucidated in Jon 
Bialecki’s virtual anthropological methodology is then explored as a 
holistic theoretical approach to the anthropology of religion, and as a means 
to contrasting a set of works from the discipline that employ Deleuze and 
Guattari in their methodological approaches. 
 The application of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts sans their 
ontological baggage provides a means of explicating the problems that 
radical constructivism poses to academic work: in the scholar that affirms 
the self-constructed nature of reality, there is a tendency towards a form of 
solipsism that asserts the separation and unbridgeable distinction between 
subjects. I take the elucidation of radical constructivism as a note of caution 
for the scholar to be aware of one’s status as an embodied individual that 
could be otherwise, within a network of institutional and epistemic 
commitments that are difficult to identify, due to them being functions of 
the very technological apparatuses we use to engage in the world.3 The 
warning: the use of a concept as a key for unlocking a poetic means of 
description can also illustrate the lack of care taken on approach to your 
subject, making the concept into an ‘aesthetic Figure’ that is no more than 
                                                
2 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues II (London: Continuum, 2006), p. 113. 
3 Ernst von Glaserfeld, ‘An Introduction to Radical Constructivism’, in Paul Watzlawick 
(ed.), The Invented Reality (New York: Norton, 1984), p. 17. 
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the assertion of the researchers’ perspectival orientation that results from 
technological extension. When this caution goes unheeded, concepts are 
extracted from their ontological framework and made to work within the 
researcher’s, making the object of “counter-effectuation” not their research 
subject, but their “secret”.4 Thomas Tweed’s Crossing and Dwelling (2007) 
is the final discussion point for this article, in which the selective-use basis 
for Tweed’s ‘fallibilistic turn’ in the study of religion is evaluated as a 
mode of religion in the Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of it. What we 
arrive at is a conception of the scholar as a scribal elite of modernity, and a 
re-assertion of criticality as a core principle in methodological approaches 
to the study of religion. 
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Conception of Religion 
The Deleuze and Guattari of What is Philosophy? conceive of religion in 
contrast to philosophy, each as thought-forms that produce particular 
visible movements of forces in the Mechanosphere. Each form of thought 
has its dangers: transcendence as the form of thought religion takes 
contains an active danger of “falling into ignorance and superstition”, 
whilst philosophy’s danger is to fall into error and prejudice. Religion is 
placed on the side of the despot: a supposed imperial One that mirrors the 
despotic form of reason is placed in service of religious personae (sages, 
priests), whilst philosophy is imagined as the function of heresy against the 
erected idols of religion, acting like a sieve against the chaos of a 
supposedly imposed order instituted by an absolute Other. Reason as 
transcendence-religion is contrasted with thought, which contains three 
characteristics in its modern image: the disruption of an oblique 
relationship between truth and thought, with the latter as a vehicle of 
creation (Nietzsche); thought as a simple possibility of thinking, shaped by 
the violence done to an individual that simultaneously makes them 
announce and renounce themselves as a subject (Heidegger and Blanchot); 
and, what Deleuze and Guattari call the “Incapacity” of thought, emerging 
as “snarls, squeams, stammers” of creativity before proceeding like “a dog 
                                                
4 The ‘secret’ is a Derridean term for the tendencies of judgment one has that cements the 
idea of an individual as an individual, but which in effect is visible from outside of that 
individual in their treatment of everyday life. See Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death and 
Literature in Secret (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 108. 
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that seems to be making uncoordinated leaps.”5 For Deleuze and Guattari, 
this constitutes the present state of thought in relation to immanence, and 
indicates the immense difficulty of thought, caught between the lack of a 
grounding principle (truth), the inherent nature of thought to create and 
dissolve subjectivity, and the uncoordinated way that thought proceeds. 
The ability for the aesthetic to be co-opted by transcendence and locked 
down in the sensory realm is contrasted with the ‘conceptual personae’ 
brought into being by philosophers, who constitute an image of ‘Thought-
Being’ on the plane of immanence, unmediated by the instantiation of their 
employment on the terrestrial plane (i.e., a monument of Nietzsche is an 
‘aesthetic Figure’, whilst Nietzsche is ‘Nietzsche-Dionysius’). 6  The 
‘conceptual personae’ become the representatives of concepts, eluding the 
fixity of meaning through the simultaneous fusion of idea and personality 
through the vector of the author, who simultaneously brings into being the 
“conceptual personae” and, in to process, becomes it.7 
 Religions, on the other hand, come into being as vehicles of 
human-instantiated order: the creation of an empty sign that comes 
vertically onto the horizontal plane of immanence, settling “in accordance 
with a spiral” that “descends and crosses different hierarchised levels that 
are projected together on a region of the plane”, and instantiates itself 
through the creation of figures that “lay claim to prohibited resemblance.”8 
In the simplest sense of the word, the philosopher operates “conceptual 
personae” in order to speak in a voice other than their own, leaving the 
                                                
5 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), pp. 43, 52-53. 
6 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 65, 175-177. 
7 For Deleuze and Guattari, Nietzsche is the ultimate figure for achieving integration with 
‘conceptual personae’. With the death of God’s believability, Nietzsche becomes an inverted 
conception of Christ, who bore with Him “the suppression of the idea of sin, the absence of 
all ressentiment and of all spirit of revenge, the consequent refusal of all war, the revelation 
of a kingdom of God on Earth as [a] state of the heart and above all the acceptance of death 
as the proof of his doctrine.” Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: 
Continuum, 2002), p. 155. This is but one of many conceptual personae Nietzsche invoked. 
Deleuze and Guattari in fact subordinated the other conceptual personae (Zarathustra, 
Christ, Socrates, the Priest) to Nietzsche’s Dionysus; if it was an inverted Christ, it was a 
Dionysian Christ that Nietzsche had become. See Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, pp. 64-65. 
8 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 89-90. 
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identity of the author as a remaining tendency to say “I”, but leaving behind 
a trace that can be weaponised on the terrasphere as “aesthetic figures”:  
The monument does not actualize the virtual event but incorporates or 
embodies it: it gives it a body, a life, a universe.9 
Here it is useful to look at the difference between belief as a transcendent 
figure and as an immanent concept. Belief extracted from the world into 
transcendent figures of thought shields one from the impact of empiricism 
(the formulation of the subject as “the habit of saying I”). 10  Belief, 
however, can be immanentised into “a genuine concept only when it is 
made into belief in this world and is connected rather than being projected.” 
This forms an explicit contrast between religion and atheism, where 
religion only arrives at the concept by denying itself (transcendence).11 The 
application for the study of religion is evident: we can see transcendence 
operating in science in theories that are intent on “uniformisation and 
universalisation in the search for a single law, a single force, or a single 
interaction.” 12  However, in their ideal form, religion and science are 
irreconcilable, for religion is the ascribes causation to singular and absolute 
functions, creating the perception of linear proceedings that transcend the 
forms of thought they are defined against, whilst empiricism’s method of 
analogical reasoning proceeds via the immanence of our ideas to the state 
of world as it can tested by varying forms of scientific principles. In other 
words, if we take our grounded, embodied epistemic functions as an 
umbrella that shields us from the chaos of existence, religions “invoke 
dynasties of gods, or the epiphany of a single god, in order to paint a 
firmament on the umbrella”, whereas science, art, and philosophy create 
slits in the firmament to “frame in a sudden light a vision that appears 
through the rent.”13 
 We thus get a vision of the idealised forms of religion and 
philosophy, elucidated as a disintegrative dualism in which doing ‘-
philosophy’ or ‘-religion’ can exhibit the thought-form of either. In A 
Thousand Plateaus disintegrative dualisms are the operative means by 
which the Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptual schema are elucidated 
(deterritorialization vs reterritorialization; rhizomatic (horizontalist) vs 
                                                
9 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 177. 
10 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 48. 
11 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 92. 
12 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 125. 
13 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 203. 
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arborescent (hierarchical) modes of thought; jurist-priest sovereignty vs 
despotic imperial sovereignty; nomadic vs striated space; abstract machines 
vs collective assemblages of enunciation, etc.). The point of proceeding in 
this manner is to illustrate that there is a hostile nexus that a subject 
wishing to think finds themselves within, and the immense task that thought 
has to individuate into a conceptual apparatus on the plane of immanence. 
From the perspective of the Mechanosphere, religion and philosophy thus 
amount to dispositions of the individual towards techniques of 
individuation: on the terrasphere in relation to the divergence of aesthetic 
figures, and on the plane of immanence in relation to the thought-forms of 
large-scale multiplicities. We can, perhaps, condense this even further: 
religion-as-thought is the universalisation of the particular from the 
position of a coded subject, and philosophy-as-thought elucidates the 
particulars of forces from the position of a subject that identifies their 
identity with their habits. Such is evident in the positioning of empiricism 
as a recognition of a self composed by the habits of the aesthetic field: 
Empiricism knows only events and other people and is therefore a great 
creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines the subject: 
a habitus, a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of 
saying I.14  
For a methodological turn towards an individualistic and functional 
definition of religion, a formal distinction between forms of subjectivity is 
a foundational block within a Deleuzo-Guattarian model. We can thus 
clarify the Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of religion as 1) a distinction 
between aesthetic-transcendence and concept-immanence as modes of 
thought, 2) a corresponding difference between subjects that form through 
and integrate with each thought-mode, 3) the internality of reference 
between ‘aesthetic Figures’ and the transcendent that it represents,15 and 4) 
the differentiation between forms of expression (religion, philosophy, art) 
that have the ability to cut across, amalgamate, or disintegrate the 
polarities. Where A Thousand Plateaus focuses on the function of religion 
as a territorial endeavour, it is the discourse on the territorialisation of the 
epistemic field in What is Philosophy? that Bialecki’s virtual anthropology 
uses to create a systematic methodology for the study of the Deleuzo-
Guattarian umbrella, in which religions as territories on the plane of 
                                                
14 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 48. 
15 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 89. 
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immanence become noumenal objects that can be ‘counter-effectuated’ 
through discovering their technics of mnemonic embodiment and 
ascription.16 In contrast to the one-dimensionality of Tweed’s desire to 
figure out what the turn towards religion does for subjects, Bialecki’s 
methodology adds the concern of what religion does to subjects. We will 
see in the proceeding sections how the selective use of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concepts fail to take this turn, and will instead pursue the universalisation 
of the rhizome as an idealised model of thought.17 
 
Bialecki’s ‘Virtual Anthropology’ 
Bialecki’s conception of Christianity as a virtual object of study has the 
object of turning the study of religion into a process of working backwards 
from an actualised state of affairs to the affective forces 
(aesthetic/conceptual) that bring an event into being. The event in Deleuze 
and Guattari is a transparent marking within the Mechanosphere that forms, 
in the moment of its actualisation, a diagram of the forces that brought it 
into being, which can be traced back to the virtual through the actual 
(effects), and “back up to the event that gives its virtual consistency to the 
                                                
16 This is an additional element to the conception of religion as a mutable form within an 
immanent historical milieu that Brett Adkins elucidates in his close reading of A Thousand 
Plateaus. Where A Thousand Plateaus’ conception of religion is concerned with forms of 
semiotic affect that can explain the genealogy of the State, What is Philosophy? and 
Deleuze’s later work are concerned with the role of religion as a realm of affect as it is 
encoded onto the plane of immanence, making religion a mode of thought rather than an 
artefact of the environment. The historical focus of many chapters in A Thousand Plateaus 
on the emergence of religion also suggests an evolutionary model, in which religion turns 
from a mode of environmental coding into the suppression of the semiotic environment by 
the individual. See Brent Adkins, ‘Deleuze’s Theory of Religion’, in F. LeRon Shults and 
Lindsay Powell-Jones (eds), Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Religion (London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), pp. 30-36. 
17  The tendency for Deleuzo-Guattarian poetics to be taken into frameworks lacking 
negativity is the subject of Andrew Culp’s recent work, which identifies this very same 
tendency towards the universalisation of the rhizome as an uncritical affirmationist 
metaphor for all human endeavour. In Andrew Culp’s Dark Deleuze, it is the affirmationist 
tendency of Deleuzean scholarship that has occluded its analysis of power; instead of 
affirming creativity for Culp, we must now realise that creativity is the great force of 
capitalisation. It is the nondialectic application of the negative by Deleuze that analysis 
should be re-geared towards, attempting to break the collusion between “institutionalised 
morality, capitalism and the state.” Andrew Culp, Dark Deleuze (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016), pp. 13-14, 18. 
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concept [i.e., Christianity, Islam], just as it is necessary to come down to 
the actual state of affairs that provides the function with its references.”18 
 Bialecki (2012) employs Deleuze as a means of creating an 
alternative methodology to the anthropology of Christianity that will avoid 
the tendency for nominalist anthropology to descend into analyses of 
subjectification, focus on an ill-defined object, and tend towards 
ethnographic analyses of singular examples. By beginning from the 
principle that Christianity is a global phenomenon, nominalistic suspicion 
is overturned, and the category of religion is renewed by placing 
transcendence as its marker of disciplinary specificity. By assimilating a 
Deleuzo-Guattarian metaphysics to anthropological methodologies, we 
grant ontological status “to both potential and the objects they engender, 
and to demarcate this potential as having its own characteristic apart from 
those of the ‘actual’ world.”19 The nominalist approach to anthropology – 
the suspicion of abstract objects and universals – is juxtaposed to this 
“virtual realism”.20 Bialecki shows how the nominalist approach fails to 
account for the directionality that Christianity as a virtual object imposes 
upon assemblages it comes into contact with in Jarrett Zigon’s 
ethnographic work on a Russian Orthodox-sponsored heroin rehabilitation 
clinic on the rural periphery of St Petersburg. 21  After mapping the 
constituting cultural realms that produced the Mill project – Neoliberalism, 
Soviet ‘new man’ language and secular Western therapeutic techniques – 
Zigon goes on to privilege neoliberalism as an overcoding force that 
imposes directionality in the project due to its “stronger discourse”.22 The 
heresies internal to the Deleuzo-Guattarian schema are apparent: the call to 
think rhizomatically rather than in terms of arborescence is precluded by 
                                                
18 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 159. 
19  Jon Bialecki, ‘Virtual Christianity in an Age of Nominalist Anthropology’, 
Anthropological Theory, vol. 12, no. 3 (2012), p. 307. 
20 Bialecki ‘Virtual Christianity’, p. 303. 
21 Jarret Zigon, ‘Within a range of possibilities: Morality and ethics in social life’, Ethnos, 
vol. 74, no. 2 (2009), pp. 251-276 (2009); Jarret Zigon, ‘Phenomenological anthropology 
and morality: A reply to Robbins’, Ethnos, vol. 74, no. 2 (2009), pp. 286-288; Jarret Zigon, 
‘Moral and ethical assemblages: A response to Fassin and Stoczkowski’, Anthropological 
Theory, vol. 10, nos 1-2 (2010), pp. 3-15. 
22 Bialecki ‘Virtual Christianity’, p. 305. 
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imposing Neoliberalism as a dominant discourse; 23  psychological 
formatting by Russian Orthodoxy predating the emergence of 
Neoliberalism is de-privileged; and, Christianity is treated as 
“heterogeneous and unstable”.24 
 The problem arises for Bialecki in Zigon’s use of the term 
‘assemblage’, which is drawn from Ong and Collier’s Global Assemblages 
(2005) and not as it is conceptualised by Deleuze.25 Bialecki’s criticism of 
Zigon’s work is therefore re-directed to the use of the assemblage in Global 
Assemblages, in which the contributors to the volume extract the “evocative 
power of the assemblage, and of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing in 
general… rather than any formal engagement with the specificities of their 
thought.”26 Virtual anthropology attempts to invert this relationship through 
a methodology that works within the ambiguities of Deleuzo-Guattarian 
metaphysics, conceiving of the virtual plane as “historically produced and 
mutable… attached to, addressing, and predicated upon actual entities, 
creating a resonance between the actual and virtual as they go through their 
vicissitudes.”27 Thus, Christianity is conceived of as a virtual object from 
which the divergent forms of it come into being; the virtual object is traced 
                                                
23 A rhizomatic approach to the interaction between Russian Orthodoxy and Neoliberalism 
would track the transversal between each line, where the ‘arborescent pseudomultiplicity’ of 
Russian Orthodoxy enters into a multiplicity with Neoliberalism and the conception of 
transcendence in each converge, i.e., where the state and religion cross over, and the forces 
that constituted the event. See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 8-9. 
24 Bialecki ‘Virtual Christianity’, p. 305. 
25 Deleuze is cited in the introduction to Ong and Collier’s edited volume as a means of 
correlating stem cell research, conceptualising mutations in history, and in reference to 
heterogeneity in cultural formation. In each example, the Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts cited 
are not critically engaged, but poetically employed. See Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier, 
‘Global Assemblages, Anthropological Problems’, in Aihwa Ong and Stephen J. Collier 
(eds), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 4-5, n. 8, 15, nn. 47-48. Other selective uses in the 
volume include the use of Deleuze to talk of the changing character of man in the modern 
age, but neglecting to link up Deleuze’s account of the virtual; the use of assemblage as a 
codeword for reassemblage, whilst alluding to the discontinuity of “mappings”; and the 
description of Deleuze as a “social analyst” interested in the “forces of social regulation and 
identity-formation” without reference to the corpus of Deleuze’s work on subjectivisation, 
individuation and individualisation, let alone the distinct operations of each. See the chapters 
by Rabinow (pp. 40, 46), Ong (p. 338), and Lakoff (p. 197). 
26 Bialecki ‘Virtual Christianity’, p. 306. 
27 Bialecki ‘Virtual Christianity’, pp. 308-9. 
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back from its forces (e.g., Christian evangelism; carceral atonement; 
nomadic experientialism, etc.), the territories it actualises in (e.g., 
imperialistic Christendom; nineteenth century Japan; colonial Australia, 
etc.), and the point at which the virtual object becomes an actual, particular 
object.28 By conceiving of Christianity as a firmament with continuous 
aspects (i.e., ‘aesthetic Figures’) that local instantiations employ to meet the 
demands of their to-be-territorialised milieu, the tendency for “nominalistic 
anthropology” towards the fixing of causal primacy is ameliorated by 
acknowledging a set of fixed aesthetic forms that Christianity maintains 
across its territories. Such an approach is not to minimise difference, but to 
affirm difference in the experiential arena as difference: the difference of 
one Christianity to another, rather than the difference between one 
definition of religion to another. 
 Conceiving of Christianity as a virtual object of study and taken 
into an anthropological methodology, the goal becomes the “counter-
effectuation” of the virtual object through its actualisations,29 in effect 
finding the “solutions” and tracing them back to “problems”, where we find 
the constituent forces “situated not in moments but always between 
them.” 30  Counter-effectuation becomes a methodology to excavate the 
diagram of a milieu, the map of its constitutive assemblages, their 
interrelations, intensities, and actualisations.31 Here, examples from the 
anthropology of religion will be used to illustrate the pitfalls of selective-
use methodologies, and the practicality of holistic theoretical applications. 
 
Thaipusam and Singaporean Modernity 
In an ethnomusicological study of the historical changes in Singapore’s 
Hindu Thaipusam festival,32 Deleuze and Guattari are employed to describe 
the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) use of the West “as the source of its 
                                                
28 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues II, p. 112. 
29 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 157, 159. 
30 Bialecki, ‘Virtual Christianity’, pp. 312-13. 
31 The diagram shows “the space of possibilities associated with the assemblage” and 
represents the “degrees of freedom” of an assemblage’s potential to actualise, i.e., its 
connection to the virtual image of an assemblage in the diagram of a virtual idea. See 
Manuel De Landa, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity 
(London and New York: Continuum, 2006), p. 30. 
32 Jim Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space: Tamil Music and the Ethical Life 
in Singapore’, Ethnomusicology Forum, vol. 24, no. 3 (2015), pp. 380–413. 
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postcolonial identity and state formation” to “de-territorialise… the various 
immigrant and local cultures as the means to create a society ready for the 
jump to export-oriented industrialisation.”33 The study navigates a subaltern 
perspective on the differential “regulation of the senses” in postcolonial 
regimes, noting the regulatory changes to the use of loud drums during 
Thaipusam since de-colonisation as an inherited tool for the Singaporean 
State’s project of cultural homogenisation.34  
 The author touches on the particular necessary elements of 
secularism’s transcendence (capital), but contains this within a dimension 
that emphasises the oppression of the ethnic minority: the relocation 
(demolition and reconstruction) of Hindu temples, their merging with 
Taoist temples, and the removal of Indian labourers from old industrial 
heartlands has severed young Singaporean Indians’ relationship to their 
musical past, which is now “an ethnic, religious and ancestral relationship, 
not one that is sedimented in the structures of their neighbourhoods.”35 The 
de-territorialisation of people from their places of worship and of people 
from their cultural practices is a means of insulating Singaporean cultural 
heteronomy from the carnivalesque forces of its imported ethnic minority.36 
 Through the restriction of musical instruments in Thaipusam, the 
PAP’s classificatory distinction of Hindu festivals and Chinese cultural 
festivals closes the valve on the minority’s cultural production, protecting a 
homogeneous State-endorsed sound-as-religious technology in public 
space.37 The author contends that this amounts to the categorical separation 
of the secular public and private (communal, sacred) spheres by the PAP, in 
which definitional scrutiny is weaponised against Tamil culture, whose 
unhindered post-1973 musical processions are organised as movements 
“towards a ‘public’ realm”, crossing thresholds of temples and public 
spaces in a collective movement that creates points of contact between 
each.38 
                                                
33 C. J. Wan-ling Wee, The Asian Modern: Culture, Capitalist Development, Singapore 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2007), p. 9. 
34 Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space’, p. 383. 
35 Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space’, p. 408. 
36 Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space’, pp. 385-86. 
37 Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space’, p. 409. 
38 Isabelle Nabokov, Religion Against the Self: An Ethnography of Tamil Rituals (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
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 It is through taking on an uncritical perspective of an oppressed 
minority subject outside of the competing forms of the transcendent that we 
situate Sykes’ selective-use methodology, resulting in a failure to recognise 
the competing forms of transcendental organisation by the State’s re-
organisation of the Law to protect the sanctity of ‘public space’ as it is 
envisioned by the PAP, and the competing conception of public space as a 
place of cathartic bodily experience by Tamil Hindus. In this case, the map 
(i.e., categorical distinction employed by the PAP) is a vehicle of 
territorialisation, and the territory is demarcated by the operation of the 
transcendent idea of the State as it is made possible by the existence of an 
Other to subordinate within its vortex. The very existence of the Hindu 
‘religious’ festival creates the possibility of a distinction that the Chinese 
‘cultural’ festival can make in the service of a projected unity.39 The miss 
on the behalf of the author is twofold: firstly, by focusing on the ‘aesthetic 
figures’ of each grouping (festivals and their material components), Sykes 
has missed this simple observation on the oppositional composition of the 
transcendent (i.e., the necessity of the Other). This produces a second 
corresponding failure: to properly disintegrate the categorical separation of 
the religious and the secular that is weaponised against the ethnic minority. 
 
Thakur Baba and the Unsecularised Conceptual Personae 
In an anthropological investigation of the conception of sovereignty, 
Bhrigupati Singh (2012) notes the utility of Deleuze’s conception of 
differing thresholds of life: 
as a way of engaging ancestors, spirits, the undead and the not yet born, who 
subsist alongside the living… to denote points of passage across stages and 
phases of life, as the living have with their initiations, births, marriages and 
deaths, ritually marked with Thakur Baba. Secondly, thresholds also refers 
to varying degrees of intensity that may continue at postdeath thresholds, as 
a spirit is preserved or recedes from memory or ritual possession or vision... 
Such movements of life are not limited to humans, and the intensities 
involved are not fully knowable, even as they may compose or decompose 
our most “rational” selves.40 
                                                
39 Sykes, ‘Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space’, p. 403. 
40 Bhrigupati Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India: Sovereignty at Varying Thresholds 
of Life’, Cultural Anthropology, vol. 27, no. 2 (2012), p. 392. 
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Deleuze’s conception of mutable human and nonhuman forms and energies 
constitutes a “vast continuum of human and non-human life”41 in which the 
deity’s presence and character is immanent to the world it is embedded 
within. In the examples employed by Singh, the transcendent force (Thakur 
Baba) is immanent within social reality as both a devata (deity) and a shakti 
(force). The study is an example of a virtual anthropology approach to 
religion, tracing a line of counter-effectuation from the ‘solutions’ of the 
believers (worship, ritual, experience), to the ‘problem’ of sovereignty 
(Thakur Baba’s historical mutability) to account for “the shifts in the 
topology of the virtual.”42 
 The author places the repression of Thakur Baba’s worship by 
governmental authorities as a tendency of secular, modernising religious 
traditions, historically comparable with the early saintly epoch of 
Christianity, whose expulsion of ‘conceptual personae’ (saints) lead to the 
concentration of transcendent power in the higher realms. 43  The 
stigmatisation of “superstition” by secular authorities is re-imagined as a 
weapon of a competing form of sovereignty, utilised against the 
transcendent positioning of Thakur Baba by Rajput (warrior) lineages, and 
the figure of Thakur Baba as a possibility of life (i.e., an immanent 
‘conceptual personae’ available to numerous castes and tribes). The author 
traces the changing “quality of life” that the deity experiences through first-
hand investigation into stories of the deity’s interaction with the secular 
authorities, and a younger more sceptical generation of Indians who 
maintain a mixture of scepticism and reverence at a distance.44 
 The structure of Singh’s argument follows from this placement of 
Thakur Baba in competition with a higher form of sovereignty, mirroring 
                                                
41 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, edited by Anne Boyman (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2002), p. 6. 
42 Bialecki, ‘Virtual Christianity’, p. 312. 
43 Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, p. 403. 
44 The emergence of Thakur Baba as a deity occurred sometime in the Middle Ages, but, 
whilst being pointed to by privileged Rajput (a warrior genealogy) as a trace of “genealogy, 
property, and royalty”, the minor definition of Thakur Baba points to “the figure of a warrior 
as a possibility of life, open for centuries to several castes and tribes”, a myth developing 
from Thakur Baba’s continuation of battle after being decapitated. This comes from the 
tradition of the ascetics (Vir and Pir) “will to heightened power over life… to enable their 
own journeys across thresholds, to bring the unborn to life, or to bring order to the lives of 
neighbouring spirits… thus, a particular type of death is linked to the regeneration and 
maintenance of life.” Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, pp. 388-400, 404. 
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the divide between the lower and higher deities in India. Historically, the 
lower deities have distinct communication methods and territories to the 
higher deities (Varuna and Mitra). Lower deities are kept in immanent 
relationship with the human inhabitants of their territory, who prolong the 
mortality of the deity by integrating the immanent (the deity) and the 
transcendent (territorial goals) with the present situation by entering into a 
discourse with the deity involving meditative practices, prayer, negotiated 
ritual procedures, and the use of spirit mediums.45 In the perspective of a 
virtual anthropology, Singh’s conception of the changing quality of life of 
the deity a description of the change in diagrammatic features of Thakur 
Baba as a ‘conceptual personae’ that can be weaponised against intruding 
forms of sovereignty. 
 Two stories the author recounts to illustrate Thakur Baba’s 
antagonistic disposition towards the secular realm illustrate the historical 
mutability and immanent utility of the deity to the inhabitants of its 
territory. First, Thakur Baba immobilises a tax collector (Tehsildar) in 
Shahbad who refrains from following established practices for approaching 
its shrine. The tax collector had proceeded towards the shrine without 
following the customary ritual of removing one’s footwear, declaring his 
lack of care for the deity before being frozen still whilst sitting on the 
shrine: 
His body froze! There and then the deity showed him the proof of his power! 
The Tehsildar learned to show respect.46 
The second story adds to the concept of competing sovereign forms 
between the territory of the deity and the secular State by illustrating 
Thakur Baba’s traversal of life and death thresholds. The authors’ research 
assistant in Shahbad recounts that he had been born as a blessing, due to his 
fathers’ engagement in childbirth request ceremonies (mannat or jholi-
bharna) at Thakur Baba’s shrine in Tilpassi. There is interplay between 
these shrines to Thakur Baba and the ancestral deities (Preet) of a 
household (deceased family members), with the latter existing within the 
territorial force of their local deity. When the authors’ research assistant’s 
wife fell sick with an illness “that couldn’t be cured despite ‘injections’” 
(i.e., pharmaceutical treatments, with the vernacular here implying a 
disdain for their inability to identify and solve the spiritual malady at hand), 
                                                
45 Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, pp. 396, 402. 
46 Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, pp. 394-95. 
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he visited his local spirit medium. Thakur Baba possessed the medium and 
directed right-worship of an abandoned household deity’s shrine, with the 
individual approaching the deity not as an individual, but as a member of a 
household or clan that exists within the deities’ territory. The authors’ 
research assistant had become convinced not only of the power of Thakur 
Baba, but of the utility of the Brahmin spirit medium.47 
 We see here an example in which a ‘conceptual personae’ can fall 
within an orthodoxic category of religion as the study of non-human forces. 
It is the immanence of Thakur Baba to both the human realm that he 
interacts with and the transcendent bodies that he comes into contact with 
(higher deities, secular authorities) that illustrates the complexities of 
sovereignty operating in modern India. Where the selective use approach 
failed to identify the discourse between the immanent and the transcendent, 
or competing conceptions of the transcendent, Thakur Baba is here 
identified as a ‘conceptual personae’ (a warrior that continues to fight after 
decapitation, whose mortality is maintained through ritual service, and 
whose power remains immanent to a territory) that emerges in the public 
sphere when encroached upon by foreign forms of sovereignty.48 
 
Wounaan and Rhizomatic Idealism 
In an analysis of the interaction between industrial development, 
conservationism and indigeneity in an ethnographic study of the Wounaan 
peoples of North-East Panama, Julie Velasquez Runk (2009) employs the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of the rhizome to explore Wounaan 
cosmogony, and the link between river systems and Woun identity. When 
asked where one is from, a Woun “will typically respond with the name of 
their river, rather than that of their village”, the predominant settlements 
since the late 1960s.49 These villages helped the de-territorialising regimes 
of the Panama government, as well as Catholic and Evangelical 
missionaries, whose visitation of Woun settlements was made easier by the 
construction of the Pan-American Highway that ran through North Eastern 
Panama, requiring the restriction of movement for indigenous peoples 
                                                
47 Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, p. 391. 
48 Singh, ‘The Headless Horsemen of India’, p. 385. 
49 Julie Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees: Wounann’s Riverine 
Rhizomic Cosmos and Arboreal Conservation’, American Anthropologist, vol. 111, no. 4 
(2009), p. 459. 
Transcendental Academia 
Literature & Aesthetics 29 (1) 2019 106 
during its construction.50 The creation of the highway allowed access by 
loggers, who would clear space that would allow ethnic majority Mestizo 
peoples to move in and become pastoralists in de-forested areas.51 
 Due to the association of Mestizo pastoralists and logging, the 
Wounaan have been re-imagined by conservationists as “forest-dependent 
conservators of the region’s environment.” This is identified by the author 
as “a binary, arborescent logic” operating within conservationism, in which 
trees dominate the higher discourse of Western educated conservationists.52 
As a result, the Mestizo pastoralists and indigenous swiddeners are vilified 
as forest destroyers, whilst the highway is seen as beneficial for 
development. Wounaan peoples have adapted by emphasising their 
relationship to trees and forests, whilst city dwelling merchants of 
Wounaan crafts “have adopted a discourse of tropical-forest dependence to 
better sell forest-produced art.” 53  The privileged discourse of both 
conservationism and development, according to the author, means that 
conservationists and the Wounaan miss opportunities to work on other 
projects in both parties’ interests (water health due to runoff and 
deforestation), as well as the maintenance of a rhizomic kinship network 
that the Wounaan culture is drawn from heterogeneously.54 The author’s 
suggestion, drawing from the poetics of the Deleuzo-Guattarian rhizome, 
calls for a future approach to conservation that should organise around 
“more dynamic states, such as rivers and social relationships.”55 
 Whilst the emphasis on the dynamism of river-based identity and 
the holistic integration of economic, non-human (polluted river systems, 
forests), and social forces integrates aspects of Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, 
Velasquez Runk’s analysis is problematised in a way that mimics the 
subaltern disposition of Sykes’ Thaipusam study. It is the mismatch 
between an essentialised holistic “indigenous identity” and the rightly 
pointed out heterogeneous nature of Woun culture that the author fails to 
recognise in her own work, lamenting the inner-city Woun who “benefit” 
                                                
50 Benjamin Ryder Howe, ‘The forgotten highway’, The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 287, no. 3 
(2001), pp. 20-21. 
51 Alaka Wali, Kilowatts and Crisis: Hydroelectric Power and Social Dislocation in Eastern 
Panama (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 
52 Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees’, pp. 461-62. 
53 Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees’, p. 462. 
54 Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees’, pp. 462-63. 
55 Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees’, p. 463. 
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from their new “arboreal” identity.56 The through-line of Velasquez Runk’s 
analysis amounts to a lament for the rhizomic Woun identity that cannot 
assert itself in the process of cross-cultural integration with the process of 
capital development, whilst mentioning only in passing that a significant 
development undergone in Woun culture was a shift to sedentary village-
life, aided by Christian missionaries. The author points out the “syncretic 
beliefs” held by the Woun, but the passing remark leaves a set of questions 
deemed over the course of the article as unimportant: what is the 
relationship between Christian missions and sedentarisation? Is there an 
epistemic shift during the period that changed the disposition of Woun to 
the oncoming globalising forces of capital? Is the heterogeneity of the 
Woun an idealised conception of Woun cosmogony? 
 In lament of the failures for the complexity of Woun identity to be 
raised against the invading Other, the author fails to recognise that those 
traits the Woun are presenting – an adaptability to capital development, the 
ability to reconfigure Woun identity as arboreal custodians – are inherent 
traits in the Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of the Western episteme.57 Such 
a point would lead one to think that the willingness of the Woun to adapt to 
the arboreal narratives of the conservationists may have an antecedent 
epistemic juncture, but the possibility of this avenue of research into the 
religious overlay is missed by the scholar. 
 
Thomas Tweed 
Religions are confluences of organic-cultural flows that intensify joy and 
confront suffering by drawing on human and suprahuman forces to make 
homes and cross boundaries.58 
Finally, we come to Tweed’s theory of religion. Where these previous 
examples offer an illustration of the pitfalls of selective-use methodology 
with its consequences contained to journal article-length pieces, Tweed’s 
work shows how the inability to see this can solidify into a dogmatic 
assertion of differentiation that is inherently unscholarly. To illustrate this, 
we must begin with the utility of Deleuze and Guattari for Tweed, which 
                                                
56 Of note is the lament towards city-dwelling Woun who “benefit” from that identity in the 
marketplace. See Velasquez Runk, ‘Social and River Networks for the Trees’, p. 460. 
57 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 16. 
58 Thomas Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006), p. 54. 
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begins with a remarkable footnote on the differentiation of aesthetic figures 
and conceptual personae in the opening chapter of Crossing and Dwelling: 
In suggesting that theory involves tropes [i.e., Figures] as well as concepts, I 
am disagreeing with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, who suggest that the 
former is the province of religion and the latter the domain of philosophy.59 
Not only has Tweed supplanted the Deleuzo-Guattarian designation 
(‘Figures’), but with this footnote has negated the entire Deleuzo-
Guattarian corpus’ discussion of religion as a concept, whilst co-opting the 
metaphor of ‘crossings’; a metaphor employed by Deleuze and Guattari in 
the cited pages from the above quotation. 
 This claim of non-distinction between ‘Figures’ and concepts can 
be related back to Deleuze and Guattari: in an orthodoxical Deleuzo-
Guattarian reading, the utilisation of an aesthetic (i.e., the word ‘crossing’ 
from the concept it is embedded within) in service of negation constitutes 
both a fall into error for the empirical aspect of the project, and an attempt 
to weaponise the transcendent. 60  The empirical fall into error is a 
fundamental mis-reading of Deleuze & Guattari’s conception of religion, 
whilst the weaponization of definitional rigidity in service of the 
transcendent follows a line of thought elucidated by Marcel Gauchet that, 
in the process of secularisation, religion as a functional, structuring 
institution of human life has been distributed into aesthetic domains and the 
institutions of the State that guarantee collective solidarity.61 In Tweed’s 
case, the transcendent is the attempt to universalise the definition of a word, 
and to funnel the entire praxis of a discipline through the author’s own 
experience of that word’s meaning.62 In all Tweed’s tendency to take a 
                                                
59 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 2, 89-93. 
60 Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy?, p. 38. 
61 Gauchet’s “infrastructural religion” is a concept used to elucidate the emergence of a 
“visible” form of religion that emerged in the vector of Western history in dialectic with an 
“invisible” that, as humans developed more integrated relationships with material 
production, took on both a more distant and powerful quality. The modern development, 
beginning around 1700, elucidates this as the religious being functionally absorbed into 
secular institutions: “the political, the intellectual, the economic and the technical.” In the 
process the “otherness” of the previously co-standing worlds (Church and State) is 
disintegrated and distributed into the “here-and-now” of secular institutions that use the 
“substance of religion” (the gap between the “visible” and the “invisible”) as their 
“developmental mainspring.” Marcel Gauchet, The Disenchantment of the World: A 
Political History of Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 162. 
62  Such is the point made in the pages of What is Philosophy? quoted by Tweed: 
transcendence is a projection of theoretical unity that vertically instantiates itself on the 
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position against correspondence as an epistemic paradigm for scholarship, 
what emerges from the project can justifiably be called a correspondence 
theory of religion, as what religion is, is whatever religion does for a 
subject. Rather than “realism with a small r”, we get a Realism of the 
Believing Subject. 63  It is the selective-use methodology that inverts 
Tweed’s intention, and this can be isolated into two mistakes by tweed: 1) 
negating concepts in favour of definition and concurrently proceeding via 
the negation of an arbitrarily established (i.e., unconceptualized) category 
of non-religion, and 2) the proceeding Realism made possible by the 
definition’s creation of ontological gap between belief and non-belief. 
 If there is a Deleuzo-Guattarian maxim in relation to definition, it 
must be that definitions are latent concepts, waiting to be supplied with the 
clarifications that make the concept (or ‘conceptual personae’) link up with 
its constituent forces. Tweed begins his definition through the negation of 
this maxim whilst co-opting the poetic terminology and imagery used to 
elucidate it. We find then a trait of selective-use methodology: where for 
Deleuze & Guattari, clarifications “saturate” concepts, Tweed’s 
aestheticization of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts (dwelling and crossing) 
constitutes the de-saturation or dehydration of the concept. 64  We can 
elucidate the saturation of a concept as both the creation of gradations or 
hermeneutical lines from which the concept can spill forth and 
communicate its constituent forces in larger volumes of subjects. Deleuze 
& Guattari formulate this as a choice – to follow the constructive work 
done to elucidate a problem and saturate its concept, or to give in to 
aestheticisation through a weariness of thought that: 
falls back on the relative speeds that concern only the succession of 
movement from one point to another, from one extensive component to 
                                                                                                             
plane of immanence with “aesthetic Figures”, contra to the concepts that form saturated 
constellations horizontally across the plane. Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy?, pp. 
89-91. 
63 Hilary Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990), pp. 3-29. 
64 Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts gather saturation whilst crossing the plane of immanence, 
whilst the transcendent picks a point on the plane of immanence and plants figures on it, 
making space for the dwelling that arranges the vortex. There are three clarifications: 
concepts are syntagmatic, connective, and consistent, not paradigmatic, hierarchical, or 
referential. The attempt to clarify the concept is how one brings saturation to them, and is a 
process of “counter-effectuation” in and of itself. See Deleuze and Guattari, What is 
Philosophy?, pp. 89-91. 
Transcendental Academia 
Literature & Aesthetics 29 (1) 2019 110 
another, from one idea to another, and that measure simple associations 
without being able to reconstitute any concept.65 
Tweed follows this latter trend, seeing the saturated Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concept (religion) and dehydrating the concept’s interconnection of stasis 
and movement, in effect making the “simple associations” of ‘movement’ 
the investigative frame.66 In an orthodoxical Deleuzo-Guattarian schema, 
Tweed’s attempt to universalise his experience of religion is to “do” 
religion by establishing an “aesthetic Figure” (movement) that “lays claim 
to hidden resemblance.”67  Tweed’s motivations are transparent in this 
regard: beginning in his postgraduate years, Tweed’s encounters with 
Cuban Catholics celebrating their national identity through the experience 
of mourning for an idealised version of the homeland made him desire “a 
theory of religion that made sense of the religious life of transnational 
migrants and addressed three themes—movement, relation, and position.”68 
 But why does this disposition towards the dehydration of the 
concept emerge? Tweed’s description of his experience has its corollary in 
Freud’s conception of cathexis. As another case of a holistic approach to 
methodology, the Deleuzo-Guattarian extraction of cathexis’ function into 
their own schema takes with it the fundamental ontological aspects, leaving 
behind Freud’s nominal ascription of causal forces (the ego and its 
repressed oedipal objects). For Deleuze & Guattari, the cathected object 
can express itself in the individual (as a trait, a characteristic, a twitch, a 
nervous habit, etc.), but forms within gradations of collectives (self, 
                                                
65 Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy?, p. 214. 
66 A Thousand Plateaus is refuse with calls to recognise the structural linearity the codified 
“Word” imposes on thought, which is not a linear proceeding into new forms of meaning, 
freedom, or research, but a directional movement that instantiates new dynamics of power 
within the constituting semiotic apparatus. Where Tweed attempts to delineate movement 
from stasis, Deleuze & Guattari differentiate between ‘despotic signification’ and ‘social 
subjection’ semiotic apparatuses through the particular forms of movement and stasis 
inherent within each. The ‘despotic signification’ semiotic carries a signifier with it, with the 
intention of re-charging it by ascribing movements of desire back into reference with the 
constituting signifier. The subjection semiotic instead works as the false description of “a 
linear proceeding into which the sign is swept via subjects.” It is thus a differentiation in the 
stylistic (i.e., aesthetic) representation of the signifier that constitutes the subjection 
semiotic, and not the claim that there is an actual divergence between the enunciator of a 
line of flight and the regime of meaning they are enunciating from. See Deleuze and 
Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 127. 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 89-90. 
68 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, p. 5. 
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intimate relationships, families, clans, nations, etc.) as an expression of the 
tendencies within their constituting milieus that prevent the free movement 
of desire’s potential to enunciate within the collective.69 There is, however, 
a more worrying aspect to identifying Tweed’s definition as a cathected 
object of his experience. To find this, we must go back to Deleuze & 
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1968), where cathexis is an expression on the 
‘Body without Organs’ (i.e. a territory) that is allowed to emerge due to the 
composition of the territory itself. 70  Thus, the cathected substance of 
Tweed’s experience that expresses itself in his work is an arboreal idea of 
religion as ‘movement’ that transcends all of the functional aspects that 
point towards stasis. The repression is not located within an individual, but 
within the constituting milieu, raising the question of every expression: 
what allowed you to emerge? 
 This is where things become difficult for Studies in Religion 
scholars. Is it possible that Tweed’s work is allowed to come into being 
because it re-affirms a methodology that approaches the subject of religion 
from the point of view of a particular religion? Could it be that there is a 
signifier that Tweed’s fallibilistic turn attempts to furnish, at the same time 
as following a postsignifying line of negativity? In other words, could it be 
that Tweed’s theoretical approach is analogical to the Christian semiotic?71 
A structural analysis of Tweed’s centralisation of ‘movement’ suggests as 
much, correlating with the Deleuzo-Guattarian description of a priestly or 
bureaucratic class that utilises the thought-form of religion to inscribe 
movements as transcendental, linear movements (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                
69 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (London: Penguin Books, 
1973), pp. 106-7. The discourse on who or what the arborists are in A Thousand Plateaus is 
notably absent. By identifying cathexis as the agent of arborescence helps to clarify the 
collective form of agency the model is attempting to elucidate. See Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, pp. 3-25. 
70  Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 8, 293. 
71 Such was the problem Max Müller addressed at the birth of the tradition, noting that 
scholarship is a territorial endeavour “in the name of true science” that requires a specific 
form of technical expertise; in the case of religion, this requires one to learn the languages 
the great books were written in, and to “protect its sacred instincts from the inroads of those 
who think that they have a right to speak on the ancient religions of mankind.” Friedrich 
Max Müller, Introduction to the Science of Religion (Oxford: Longmans, 1882), pp. 26-28. 
Transcendental Academia 
Literature & Aesthetics 29 (1) 2019 112 
 
Figure 1 – The diagram of the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
subjection semiotic, taken from A Thousand Plateaus.72 
 
And here lies the sleight of hand that emerges from Tweed’s argument for 
the necessity of disciplinary boundedness through definitional rigidity: the 
fallibility of the observer in relation to the object of research is now given, 
and the observer can only speak insofar as they become a bureaucratic 
scribe for the ‘movement’ of believers.73  The researchers’ “positioned 
representations of a changing terrain by an itinerant cartographer” that 
“emerge from within categorical schemes and social contexts”74 clarifies 
the position of the scholar as a documenter of what believing subjects say 
of themselves. This makes Tweed’s a theory of effect, comparative to 
Bialecki’s virtual anthropology as a methodology focused on affect. 
 An immediate problem becomes visible: the fallibility of the 
scholar due to their embodied position75 corresponds with the fallibility of 
                                                
72 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 137. 
73 “We are stuck with the category religion, since it fixes the disciplinary horizon, and our 
use of it can be either more or less lucid, more or less self-conscious. So we are obliged to 
be as clear as possible about the kind of definition we are offering and the orienting tropes 
that inform it.” Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, p. 53. 
74 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, pp. 13, 15-16. 
75 The fallibility of the scholar is a principled position that we should attempt to inculcate in 
our pedagogical strategies to bridge the divides between differing methodological 
conceptions for the study of religion. This is present in Crossing and Dwelling, but made 
explicit in Tweed’s presidential address to the American Academy of Religion. Thomas 
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the believing subject contra to a superior, unattainable (i.e., divine, all-
seeing) position that has independent access to the realms of experience.76 
The consequences of the selective-use methodology in Tweed’s case lie in 
this reintroduction of an ontologically necessitated fallible subject. Perhaps 
the simplest explanation is that absolute ontological differences necessitate 
Tweed’s selective-use of Deleuze and Guattari, for Tweed’s assertion that 
there is no distinction between the aesthetic and the conceptual fails to see 
that his definition lacks every clarification of the concept that Deleuze and 
Guattari propose of it, and is in and of itself a religious endeavour (i.e., that 
religion as a thought structure is hierarchical, referential, and 
paradigmatic).77 Nowhere so obvious is this trait than Tweed’s placement 
of religion as a supreme form of expression: 
Most important for delineating religion, religions mark and cross the 
ultimate horizon of human life. Other cultural trajectories – for example, art, 
music, and literature – can mark and traverse the boundaries of the natural 
terrain and the limits of embodied life. Those other cultural forms, however, 
usually do not appeal to superhuman forces or map cosmic space – and they 
do not offer prescriptions about how to cross the ultimate horizon.78 
It is this attempt to fix the concern of an “ultimate horizon” as a guarantor 
of religion as a weak sui generis form that leads Tweed to this conclusion, 
and us to the most perplexing state – by making the ‘trope’ of “ultimate 
horizon” as a distinguishing feature of religious and non-religious cultural 
forms.79 It is clear that this trope, combined with the centralisation of 
movement and relation as a corrective for “theories that have presupposed 
stasis and minimised interdependence”, 80  is intended as a concept of 
religion that dissolves the ‘aesthetic Figures’/‘conceptual personae’ 
                                                                                                             
Tweed, ‘Valuing the Study of Religion: Improving Difficult Dialogues Within and Beyond 
the AAR’s “Big Tent”’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 84, no. 2 (2016), 
p. 298. 
76 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, pp. 17, 193 n. 18. 
77 The assertion of relation occurring across boundaries (i.e., an ontological gap) creates 1) 
an ontological gap between the believer and the non-believer, the latter suddenly deprived of 
the medium (religion) through which boundaries are crossed, and 2) a bridge between 
believer and researcher that requires an entirely new referential medium (definition) in 
which haves/have nots (hierarchy) can be delineated, and returned into a scholarly format as 
a truth in the experience of the scholar and the academy (paradigmatic). See Deleuze and 
Guattari, What is Philosophy?, pp. 89-91. 
78 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, p. 76. 
79 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, p. 68. 
80 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p. 77. 
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distinction. As a concept of religion, however, it relies on the trope of an 
“ultimate horizon” as its concept, requiring the scholar to accept an 
arbitrary distinction between concerns of this world and concerns of 
another world in the eyes of a believer as the determining variable that 
makes religions distinct from all other cultural forms.81 As a theory of the 
subject, we get a Realism of the subject in which methodological 
considerations are based in the epistemic co-ordinates of the researcher and 
their subject within the net of a world with an “ultimate horizon”. As a 
result, any set of declarations from any perspectival orientation, such as the 
biases inherent to a “white, male, middle-class professor of religious 
studies”,82 become excuses for any and every theoretical debasement. 
 Peeling back a layer, we can apply Deleuze and Guattari to 
discover that the above self-declaration of subjectivity by Tweed is in fact a 
mis-labelling. It is best to understand Tweed’s work, I propose, as the work 
of a scholar that has embodied an epistemic framework functionally 
equivalent to a scribal elite class. The Deleuzo-Guattarian qualification of 
the role of the philosopher as a functionary of the State is instructive: the 
philosopher becomes a functionary of the State (a public professor) at “the 
moment the State-form inspired an image of thought.” The relationship, 
however, is reciprocal – the form of reasoning the State requires is 
produced by its scribal elite.83 Thus, we can expect that a renewal of the 
utility of a bureaucratic class will come through its discovery of a means 
with which it can become a more effective appendage of a State apparatus. 
 And here, we turn to Tweed’s presidential address to the American 
Academy of Religion (AAR). The address continues the attempt to 
disseminate the ‘fallibility of the researcher’ turn that Crossing and 
Dwelling proposes, proposing that warring factions (theologians and non-
theologian researchers of religion) take an approach based on “empathy, 
humanity, and generosity.” An olive branch between the factions is opened 
up by identifying a common cause (continued employment) and naming the 
solution: a pragmatism that can identify the effective discourse in which 
members can lobby State benefactors for the continuation of their 
departments, based on the constituting history of each members’ State 
                                                
81 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, pp. 76-77, 216 n. 25. 
82 Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling, p. 7. 
83 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 376. 
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apparatus.84 Whilst Tweed’s speech is refuse with pragmatic suggestions 
for the utility of religious studies programs to civil society, the most 
instructive example for the nexus between the academy and the State is in 
Tweed’s use of a statement by then United States Secretary of State John 
Kerry: 
I often say that if I headed back to college today, I would major in 
comparative religions rather than political science. That is because religious 
actors and institutions are playing an influential role in every region of the 
world and on nearly every issue central to U.S. foreign policy.85 
For while thus far we have seen the theoretical misgivings of Tweeds’ 
work, the case of Kerry’s appointment – Shaun Casey, of the Wesley 
Theological Seminary – to the Kerry-formed Office of Religion and Global 
Affairs at the US State Department is instructive as to the function of 
Tweed’s fallibilistic turn. Where Tweed wishes for the insertion of 
scholarly fallibilism to act as a medium through which scholars with 
differing cosmological persuasions can empathise with each others projects, 
we see in a recent interview by Casey that the fallibilism of the individual 
can just as well be weaponised against competing truth claims in the public 
sphere. Tweed’s insertion of fallibilism as a means for empathy can only 
function with in-group solidarity, based around the necessity of maintaining 
employment and the formation of a discourse that can leverage the groups’ 
position in the corporatist nexus of the democratic nation State. We see in 
an interview on Christian interpretations of Trump’s border wall how, 
without the in-group solidarity, the principle of empathy is inverted by 
Casey dismissing his opposition by pointing to their fallibilism: 
Well, I think there is a minority of American Christians – they're 
overwhelmingly white. They're overwhelmingly Republican. They're 
overwhelmingly influenced by this sort of ragtag group of folk, you know, 
on the evangelical advisory board the White House has – who are going to 
endorse any kind of strongman move the president makes because 
ultimately, a passage like Romans 13 and this very strict, narrow 
misinterpretation of it authorizes that view.86 
Casey’s attack on the perspectival interpretations coupled with the 
lack of personal diatribe in preceding attacks on the Republican 
                                                
84 Tweed, ‘Valuing the Study of Religion’, pp. 297-300. 
85 John Kerry, ‘Religion and Diplomacy’, America, vol. 213, no. 6 (2015), pp. 1-5. 
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administration87 illustrate the ‘aesthetic’ of fallibilism: an arena of 
public tender in which everyone’s perspective is fair game in the 
pursuit of becoming a bureaucrat. The pragmatism of grounding 
disciplinary cohesion as Tweed envisions it is hard to square with 
this conclusion. In the flow-on effects of fallibilism, it is impossible 
to envisage how empathy as Tweed envisages it can result in 
anything more than a temporary, politically pragmatic ceasefire, with 
an absolute inability to agree on the current composition of a State 
preventing the formation of tactics that could make one’s practice 
function for it. Instead, we see another example of how a selective-
use methodology is unable to follow the conclusions of its premises 
due the tendency the arbitrary perspectival observations of a researcher to 
debase, through simplification, the complexity of ontological apparatuses 
that thought comes into contact with. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay began by problematising the selective-use of Deleuzo-
Guattarian theory within the anthropology of religion. Noting the key 
aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s framework as a distinction between the 
‘images of thought’, conceptualised as ideal forms of philosophy and 
religion, the methodology proposed by Jon Bialecki was evaluated for its 
adherence to a Deleuzo-Guattarian schema. Using practical examples, we 
saw how selective-use methodologies employing Deleuzo-Guattarian 
concepts were unable to describe the ontological function of religions as a 
                                                
87 Casey’s reactive tendency to ascribe interpretation other than his own as misinterpretation 
point misses the obvious: any argument for present-day morality based on ancient texts are 
grounded in contingency, and misinterpretation is, within a discourse that maintains a 
principle of fallibility, to be expected. For the matter at hand, reconciling “Render unto 
Caesar the things that are Caesar’s” (Mark 12:17, King James Version) with Casey’s 
position at the State Department seems to require a degree of interpretation that, from 
another perspective, can just as easily be construed as misinterpretation. In the context of the 
preceding discourse, however, Casey’s disdain for the administration that folded the office 
he had helped to set up is instructive for reading his call for its reinstatement by a future 
administration as a call for the necessity of his particular bureaucratic form to the United 
States role as an agent of global influence. Shaun Casey, ‘How the State Department has 
Sidelined Religion’s Role in Diplomacy’, Religion and Politics (2017), at 
https://religionandpolitics.org/2017/09/05/how-the-state-department-has-sidelined-religions-
role-in-diplomacy. Accessed 19/02/2019. 
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competition between transcendental schemas, and unable to accurately 
identify religion as a primary historical actor. Thomas Tweed’s Crossing 
and Dwelling was then critiqued for its inadequate dispensation with the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptual distinction between forms of thought. In 
Tweed’s case, the selective-use methodological approach not only 
simplifies the rigorous complexities of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought, but 
opens himself up to criticism by the Deleuzo-Guattarian corpus itself. We 
found that the selective-use methodology employs embodied meaning that, 
in the assertion of a principle of fallibilism, amounts to the creation of an 
infinitely applicable excuse for a lack of critical engagement, based on the 
identity of the researcher. In the place of this tendency, Bialecki’s 
methodological approach to the anthropology of religion is an integrated 
work of applied theory. Using the entirety of the Deleuzo-Guattarian 
schema, we see how the fallibilistic turn that Tweed attempts to make can 
be re-engineered to accurately place the scholar as a scribal elite class in 
modernity. 
 In place of Tweed’s proposal, the simplest route is to revert to a 
model of scholarship for the study of religion advocated by Bruce Lincoln, 
in which we speak with “a human and fallible voice” but as an authority 
through “rigorous critical practice.”88 Lincoln’s call follows that of his 
predecessors: J.Z. Smith’s claim that the classical materials for the study of 
religion – the work of scribal elites (maps, territorial markings, 
cosmogonies fixing order)89 – should be approached with scepticism is here 
reimagined as a cautionary note for the scholar, who occupies a role 
structurally analogous to the scribal elites of antiquity. Simply put, this note 
of caution is twofold. 1) The scholar must recognise their place within an 
institutional net in which it is not just biological or socioeconomic identity 
that structures your perspective, but the basis of your epistemic givens as 
they are developed through your own habits, within technological 
environments, and at the demand of our constituting institutions.90 2) The 
                                                
88 Bruce Lincoln, ‘Theses on Method’, Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, vol. 8, no. 
3 (1996), §3. 
89 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map Is Not Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 
pp. 293-94. 
90 Here, Walter Ong’s work is instructive. Taking from Ong’s differentiation of the oral and 
literate modes of thought, troubling inferences emerge in that we appear to embody the 
perspectival orientation of the discursive tools we use (e.g., literacy or orality). Continued 
discourse on the position of the scholar in modernity should follow lines that emphasise the 
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scholar must understand the tendency for aesthetic preferences as 
unqualified theoretical assertions to be an amputation of style from 
substance that debases any argument for authority that the academy may 
wish to make. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
intensive relationship between our tools and our perspectives. See Walter Ong, Orality and 
Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). 
